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BECKER, Circuit Judge. 
              This is an appeal from an order of the district court 
granting summary judgment for defendant trucking companies in an 
action by plaintiff owner-operators seeking to set aside a labor 
arbitration award.  Jurisdiction arises under § 301 of the Labor 
Management Relations Act.  29 U.S.C. § 185.  The appeal presents 
the question whether the arbitrators acted within the authority 
conferred upon them by the parties' agreement, or rather decided 
issues beyond the parties' submissions.  Concluding that the 
arbitrators exceeded their authority, we reverse. 
                 I.  Facts and Procedural History 
              Plaintiffs are 46 truck drivers and two local chapters 
of their union, Local 560 and Local 917 of the International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters.  Defendants Ryder Systems, Inc. and 
related companies ("Ryder" or "company") are engaged in the 
commercial carriage of automobiles.  Plaintiffs use their own 
tractors to pull defendants' trailers, delivering cars and light 
trucks out of Ryder's terminal in Northern New Jersey to new car 
dealers throughout New England, the Middle Atlantic States, and 
parts of the Midwest. 
              At all relevant times, the parties were subject to a 
collective bargaining agreement known as The National Master 
Automobile Transporters Agreement ("Master Agreement").  From 
June 1, 1991, when the Master Agreement went into effect, until 
August 16, 1994, when the arbitration award that is the subject 
of this appeal was rendered, the drivers' compensation was 
governed by the Master Agreement and related leases by which the 
drivers dedicated their tractors exclusively to Ryder's business.  
Payment to the drivers was based on a percentage of the gross 
revenue paid to Ryder by the shippers.  Despite the fact that the 
Master Agreement provides that no negotiated agreement between an 
employer and its drivers shall entitle the drivers to payment of 
any amount less than 65% of the gross revenues the employer 
receives from a shipper, the lease agreements provide that 
drivers receive 60% or 61% depending on the number of vehicles 
shipped.  It was the lease agreements that determined the 
drivers' share.  The agreement (and practice under the lease) 
further makes clear that the drivers were to be reimbursed for 
the full amount of all tolls they actually paid. 
              The Master Agreement and the related leases also 
included a "toll schedule," which (very roughly) represented an 
average of the tolls that would be incurred on a trip from 
Ryder's terminal to certain broadly defined geographical areas 
encompassing entire states or groups of states.  Prior to 
calculating the driver's share, Ryder would deduct from the gross 
revenue the amount specified by the toll schedule for the 
particular trip.  At some point, Ryder unilaterally (and in the 
drivers' submission, arbitrarily) increased this toll schedule, 
retroactive to April 1992.  In so doing, Ryder decreased the base 
(gross revenue) from which the drivers' share was calculated, 
thereby decreasing payments to the drivers.  Ryder's actions 
precipitated the dispute that is now before us. 
              In addition to concern over changes in the toll 
schedule, a number of drivers discovered instances in which Ryder 
paid them 60% of the gross revenue when, in their opinion, they 
were entitled to 61%.  Those drivers invoked the grievance 
machinery of the Master Agreement.  In the initial grievance 
(the "Matteson grievance"), they complained that Ryder's actions 
with respect to the toll schedule and the gross revenue share 
calculations had violated "Addendum 'C'" and "Exhibit 'B'" of the 
lease agreements.  Addendum C of the lease agreements 
establishes the toll schedule for trips originating from the Port 
Jersey terminal; Exhibit B assigns the threshold number of cars a 
driver must transport to receive 61% rather than 60% of the 
company's gross revenue. 
              When members of Local 560 learned that they were also 
being charged increases in the toll schedule and that the 
increases were effective retroactively to April 1992, their shop 
steward, Fred Worth, submitted a "class action" grievance on 
behalf of the drivers (the "560 grievance").  The written 
grievance identified the subject matter in the following 
language: 
              "TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN 
              I FIND THE COMPANY IN VIOLATION OF ARTICAL [sic] #49 OF 
              THE MASTER AGREMENT [sic].  I ASK FOR ALL MONIES TO BE 
              RETURN [sic] TO DRIVERS AFECTED [sic] AND A CEASE AND 
              DESIST. 
 
              SECTION 4 A, C SECTION 5 TOLLS" 
 
              Article 49 of the Master Agreement, entitled "Owner- 
Operator," covers a broad range of issues including, but by no 
means limited to, toll charges and revenue shares.  Section 4(a) 
of Article 49 deals with the revenue share for the driver and 
requires that the drivers receive no less than 65% of the gross 
revenue.  Section 4(c) of Article 49 ensures that any increases 
in the payments Ryder receives will be reflected in the drivers' 
receipts, and briefly mentions tolls.  Finally, Section 5 
delineates the payment responsibilities as between the drivers 
and Ryder, including the responsibilities for "turnpike fees, 
road tolls and bridge tolls."  Larry Ervin, Ryder's Director of 
Labor Relations, has acknowledged (in his October 31, 1994 
Affidavit) that "[r]epresentatives of Locals 560 and 917 advised 
me that this grievance protested the changes the April 1992 
ancillary schedule made to the February 1991 schedule." 
              The Local 560 grievance together with the Matteson 
grievance were heard before the Joint Committee.  See supra note 
2.  On a pre-hearing information form, used by the Joint 
Committee "as a preliminary general statement of [the parties'] 
position[s]," Daniel Coughlin, a union representative, set forth 
the basis for the unions' grievance before the Joint Committee.  
Under the section entitled "Circumstances of the Dispute," 
Coughlin typed "XXX" on the appropriate line to indicate a "Back 
Pay Claim" and typed "TOLLS" on the line to indicate "Others."   
He also noted that the relevant sections of the Master Agreement 
about which he was concerned were "ARTICLE 49, SECTION 4A, 4C 
SECTION 5, ARTICLE 49, SECTION 14."  Section 14 of Article 49 
states that no lease entered into pursuant to the Master 
Agreement may conflict with the Master Agreement. 
              In an additional, undated submission to the Joint 
Committee, Coughlin attempted to explain more clearly the 
grievance he was pursuing.  He wrote almost exclusively about the 
toll increases, noting that each lease agreement had a toll 
schedule and that "[t]he toll charges have been raised 
dramatically by the Company and they raised these charges with no 
explanation or substantiating paper work reflecting why the 
charges are raised."  In a further, also undated submission, 
Coughlin quoted from the Master Agreement the provisions on which 
the unions' grievance is based.  He cited the same provisions as 
those cited on the pre-hearing information form. 
              The minutes of the hearing itself, though unfortunately 
not transcriptions, further inform the reasons for the grievance.  
Coughlin began the argument over the merits of the grievance by 
discussing the increases in the toll schedules.  He went on to 
object to the "entire structure."  (No explanation is provided as 
to what that phrase refers.)  Local 917 joined in protest of the 
manner in which Ryder was charging the unions for tolls.  In 
response, Ervin referred to the documents submitted by the unions 
and claimed that those same documents allowed Ryder to implement 
increases in the toll structure. 
              Without deciding the matter, the Joint Committee 
referred the grievance back to the parties for negotiations to be 
completed within sixty days.  When the parties could not reach an 
agreement, the unions requested, by letter, that the Joint 
Committee re-hear the case.  In the letter, Coughlin again 
importuned the Joint Committee to hold the increase in the toll 
schedule to be in violation of the Master Agreement.  Coughlin 
also maintained that the original toll charge, presumably the 
toll schedule itself, was in violation of the Master Agreement. 
              The Joint Committee re-heard the grievance.  Al Valle, 
on behalf of Local 560, reported to the Joint Committee that 
"[i]t is the position of the locals that the Company illegally 
raised the toll tariffs and requests that they be rescinded and 
to be made whole for all increases made at the time it was 
initiated."  Jack Shea, on behalf of Local 917 "agreed that this 
was the position of both locals."  Finally, Ervin, on behalf of 
Ryder, began by noting that the original grievance included 
complaints about the percentage of gross revenue to which the 
drivers were entitled.  Through discussions, however, the parties 
narrowed the issue to the toll increases.  Ervin went on to 
state, inter alia, 
              What is at issue is the increase in the tolls hold 




              Now the grievance indicates that the only issue is 
              that the leases remain the same.  There is no 
              protest regarding the percentage; that all they 
              want to do is protest the toll increase that was 
              implemented in 1992.  That is the current case. 
 
              At the close of the hearing, the case was referred to a 
subcommittee comprised of one union representative and one 
management representative.  Prior to the referral, the Joint 
Committee instructed the parties to provide the subcommittee with 
the previous toll schedule; the toll schedule in dispute; any and 
all documents justifying the toll schedule increase; and, a 
description of what is contained in the toll schedule.  Based 
upon the report of the subcommittee, the full Committee made the 
following decision: 
 
              1.   All owner operators will receive 65% of 
                   the revenue received by the Company 
                   beginning July 18, 1994. 
 
              2.   An ancillary charge of $13.35, 
                   which has been justified, will be 
                   charged on both the headhaul and 
                   backhaul. 
 
              3.   The Company will convert to a 
                   single factor tariff concept, with 
                   drivers paying their own tolls with 
                   no Company reimbursement.  This 
                   will eliminate the Company's toll 
                   holdback system. 
 
              4.   The Company is directed to pay the 
                   difference between the two (2) toll 
                   schedules in question for all owner 
                   operators party to this grievance 
                   beginning April 1, 1994. 
 
              5.   This decision resolves all 
                   outstanding grievances on all 
                   related issues. 
 
              6.   The Committee finds that because 
                   the Company failed to respond in a 
                   timely manner to the wage reviews 
                   filed by grievants Matteson, Gati 
                   and Rozell, these claims are upheld 
                   for the full amounts claimed, 
                   consistent with Article 7. 
 
              7.   This settlement should set no 
                   precedent for any other cases. 
 
              The drivers responded to the Joint Committee's ruling 
by filing a complaint in the District Court for the District of 
New Jersey.  The relevant count in the complaint for present 
purposes is Count I, which contended that the arbitration award 
should be vacated because the arbitrators went beyond the scope 
of the submissions to reach their conclusion and the ultimate 
award, on its merits, did not draw its essence from the 
collective bargaining agreement.  Of particular concern to the 
drivers was the imposition of the ancillary charges from 
Paragraph 2 of the award.  The drivers moved for summary judgment 
as to Count I; Ryder responded with a cross motion for summary 
judgment. 
              The district court granted Ryder's motion.  It began 
its discussion by noting the extreme deference a court is to 
afford an arbitrator's decision, including the interpretation of 
the scope of the arbitrator's own power under the collective 
bargaining agreement and/or the parties' submissions.  Quoting 
United Transportation Union Local 1589 v. Suburban Transit Corp., 
51 F.3d 376 (3d Cir. 1995), the court stated that "'there must be 
absolutely no support at all in the record justifying the 
arbitrator's determinations for a court to deny enforcement of an 
award.'"  Id. at 379 (quoting News America Publications, Inc. v. 
Newark Typographical Union, Local 103, 918 F.2d 21, 24 (3d Cir. 
1990)).  The court then went on to examine the submissions to the 
arbitrator and concluded that the submissions covered a range of 
issues including, but by no means limited solely to, the toll 
schedule.  Therefore, it reasoned, the submission supported the 
Joint Committee's interpretation of the scope of its power. 
              The district court next examined the arbitration award 
itself to determine if it "[drew] its essence from the collective 
bargaining agreement."  United Steelworkers of America v. 
Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).  
Relying again on the forgiving standard of review as set forth in 
Suburban Transit, the court concluded that the arbitration award 
represented an arguably reasonable interpretation of the Master 
Agreement.  It therefore held that the decision of the Joint 
Committee as to the merits of the grievance should not be 
disturbed. 
                     II.  Standard of Review 
              Because we review a district court decision that itself 
reviewed an arbitration award subject to a particular standard, 
it is fitting to elaborate just a bit on our usually brief 
statement concerning the correct standard of review.  In Mobil 
Oil Corp. v. Independent Oil Workers Union, 679 F.2d 299 (3d Cir. 
1982), we stated that the standard for reviewing an arbitrator's 
interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement should be 
the same as that for reviewing an arbitrator's interpretation of 
the issue submitted.  See id. at 302.  In Exxon Shipping Co. v. 
Exxon Seamen's Union, 73 F.3d 1287 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub 
nom. Seariver Maritime, Inc. v. Exxon Seamen's Union, 116 S. Ct. 
2515 (1996), we noted that we apply the same standard in 
reviewing the district court's decision as that court did in 
reviewing the arbitrator's interpretation of the collective 
bargaining agreement.  See id. at 1291.  Therefore, our review of 
the validity of the arbitration award must be subject to the same 
standard as that which governed the district court's review. 
              Under the Federal Arbitration Act, a district court may 
vacate an arbitration award if, inter alia, "the arbitrators 
exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a 
mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter 
submitted was not made."  9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4).  In other words, 
an arbitrator may not venture beyond the bounds of his or her 
authority.  See United Steelworkers, 363 U.S. at 597 - 98.  As is 
often the case, the authority of the arbitrator is defined not 
simply by the collective bargaining agreement, but is determined 
in large measure by the parties' submissions.  See, e.g., Sun 
Ship, Inc. v. Matson Navigation Co., 785 F.2d 59, 62 (3d Cir. 
1986).  In such cases, then, it follows that an arbitrator has 
the authority to decide only the issues actually submitted.  SeeUnited 
Parcel Serv., Inc. v. International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Local 
Union No. 439, 55 F.3d 138, 142 (3d Cir. 1995) ("[A]n 
[arbitration] award will, of course, be enforceable only to the 
extent it does not exceed the scope of the parties' 
submission."); see also United Steelworkers, 363 U.S. at 598 
(upholding an arbitration award but implying that were the award 
"beyond the submission" it would have been vacated).  It is the 
responsibility of the arbitrator in the first instance to 
interpret the scope of the parties' submission, but it is within 
the courts' province to review an arbitrator's interpretation.  
See, e.g., Mobil Oil, 679 F.2d at 302. 
              We must now determine the appropriate standard for our 
review of that interpretation.  We are not writing here on a 
blank slate.  In Mobil Oil, we wrote that "the deference that is 
accorded to an arbitrator's interpretation of the collective 
bargaining agreement should also be accorded to an arbitrator's 
interpretation of the issue submitted."  679 F.2d at 302.  We 
provided three reasons for such deference, which results in 
"singularly undemanding" judicial review.  United Transp. Union, 
51 F.3d at 379 (quoting News America, 918 F.2d at 24).  First, a 
more searching judicial review of submissions to an arbitrator 
would undermine the congressional policy of promoting speedy, 
efficient, and inexpensive resolution of labor grievances.  SeeMobil Oil, 
679 F.2d at 302.  Second, interpretation of a 
submission must often occur in the context of the collective 
bargaining agreement itself.  Therefore, it would be inconsistent 
to accord deference to the interpretation of the collective 
bargaining agreement but not to the submission.  See id.  
Finally, requiring courts to engage in a close examination of the 
submissions to arbitrators would put a considerable strain on 
judicial resources.  See id. 
              Given the language employed to describe the standard 
for reviewing an award on the merits, there is no doubt that our 
review of the interpretation of a submission is highly 
deferential.  See, e.g., News America, 918 F.2d at 24 ("[T]here 
must be absolutely no support at all in the record justifying the 
arbitrator's determinations for a court to deny enforcement of an 
award.") (emphasis added); Ludwig Honold Mfg. v. Fletcher, 405 
F.2d 1123, 1128 (3d Cir. 1969) (upholding an arbitrator's award 
so long as its "interpretation can in any rational way be derived 
from the [collective bargaining] agreement") (emphasis added). 
              Effusively deferential language notwithstanding, the 
courts are neither entitled nor encouraged simply to "rubber 
stamp" the interpretations and decisions of arbitrators.  See,e.g., Leed 
Architectural Prods., Inc. v. United Steelworkers of 
America, Local 6674, 916 F.2d 63, 65 (2d Cir. 1990) ("This great 
deference, however, is not the equivalent of a grant of limitless 
power.").  Courts still maintain a significant role in the labor 
arbitration process; they have not been relegated to the status 
of merely offering post-hoc sanction for the actions of 
arbitrators.  Rare though they may be, there will be instances 
when it is appropriate for a court to vacate the decision of an 
arbitrator.  This is one of them. 
        III.  Did the Arbitrators Exceed Their Authority? 
              We turn to the ultimate decision of the Joint Committee 
to determine if it went beyond the scope of the authority 
conferred upon it by the parties.  As we have noted, an 
arbitrator has the authority to decide only the issues actually 
submitted.  See, e.g., United Parcel Serv., 55 F.3d at 142.  We 
are hampered in the effort to define the issues submitted by the 
failure of the parties in this case to prepare a single document 
containing the issues they wished to submit to the Joint 
Committee.  Instead, we are confronted with a tangle of 
documents, penned over a two-year time period, no single one of 
which is dispositive and many of which are hand written, 
incomplete, and obviously drafted without expert assistance. 
              The obvious first step is to prescribe the relevant 
time frame.  Must we consider all of the documents during the 
entire two years of the dispute, or should we study only those 
documents generated at or near the time of the final hearing?  
Precedent sheds little light on this question, because in the 
usual arbitration the parties formulate a single, controlling 
submission.  See, e.g., Sun Ship, 785 F.2d at 62.  Reasoning from 
the general principles set forth in that precedent, we can, 
however, answer the question. 
              "[A]rbitration is a creature of contract."  United 
Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg., 363 U.S. 564, 570 
(1960) (Brennan, J., concurring).  Though spoken in the context 
of interpreting the collective bargaining agreement, Justice 
Brennan's simple description aptly frames our inquiry.  As in 
contract law, the touchstone for interpreting a submission must 
be the intention of the parties.  See Local 1199, Drug Hospital 
and Health Care Employees Union, RWDSU, AFL-CIO v. Brooks Drug 
Co., 956 F.2d 22, 25 (2d Cir. 1992).  It is the parties, not the 
arbitrator, who decide the issues submitted; absent a formal, 
written submission, we must look to the parties' conduct as a 
whole.  See International Chemical Workers Union, Local No. 566 
v. Mobay Chemical Corp., 755 F.2d 1107, 1110 (4th Cir. 1985).  To 
determine the intent of the parties given the circumstances in 
this case, then, we cannot limit ourselves simply to one or a few 
documents.  Nor can we rely on isolated statements within those 
documents.  Rather, we must examine the documents with an eye 
towards arranging each of them to create a complete picture. 
              When we examine the entire history of the grievance in 
this case, it becomes patent that the issue the parties 
ultimately agreed to submit to the Joint Committee was the 
increase in the toll schedule.  The drivers did draft documents 
and made statements that, if taken out of context, could be 
construed as referring to issues beyond the toll schedule, 
especially in the early stages of the dispute.  Some documents 
referred to the percentage of gross revenue due the drivers; more 
documents referenced provisions of the Master Agreement that 
governed issues well beyond toll payments.  As the dispute 
progressed, however, the drivers ceased to mention the gross 
revenue percentages.  And, the referenced provisions in the 
Master Agreement, though often governing a wide range of issues, 
invariably included references to toll payments. 
              The only consistent theme running through all the early 
documents and statements is the increase in the toll schedule.  
As the dispute progressed further, it became ever more plain that 
the parties focused their dispute on the increase in the toll 
schedule.  By the time of the last hearing before the Joint 
Committee, it was the toll schedule, and nothing more, over which 
the parties argued.  The clearest statement of the dispute, in 
fact, comes from Ervin, the Ryder representative, who reported to 
the Joint Committee that "all [the drivers] want to do is protest 
the toll increase." 
              The drivers maintain that the request of the Joint 
Committee to have the parties provide information about the toll 
schedule is important.  We agree that the request is important, 
but, as the district court stated, it is not dispositive.  But 
the fact that the Joint Committee requested only information 
about the toll schedules suggests that, at the time of the final 
hearing, the Joint Committee believed that the only issue the 
parties wished to submit to it was the toll schedule.  The 
request is, in other words, support for our conclusion that the 
intent of the parties was to arbitrate only the increase in the 
toll schedule. 
              Ryder and the district court emphasize isolated 
statements and documents without contextualizing them.  As we 
have explained above, such a narrow focus is inappropriate in 
this case.  Ryder and the district court attach too great 
significance to documents drafted early in the dispute that 
contain references to the percentage of gross revenues due the 
drivers.  Similarly, both Ryder and the district court devote 
much attention to references to provisions in the Master 
Agreement that discuss issues beyond the toll schedules.  Such 
attention is especially misplaced when other language in those 
documents makes clear that what the drivers were concerned about 
was the tolls. 
              For example, both Ryder and the district court point to 
a letter Coughlin, a union representative, wrote that quotes from 
the Master Agreement.  In that same letter, however, he wrote 
almost exclusively about the toll schedules.  Additionally, both 
Ryder and the district court correctly point out that in the 
minutes before the Joint Committee Coughlin "not only protests 
the raise, but the entire structure."  However, the surrounding 
language in the minutes, which referred only to the toll 
schedule, makes it obvious that this reference to "the entire 
structure" is not a reference to the entire compensation scheme. 
              Finally, Ryder observes that, when Ervin stated that 
the only matter before the Joint Committee was the increase in 
the toll schedule, Coughlin did not agree, but rather raised a 
point of order.  Ryder claims that if the drivers truly did wish 
to arbitrate only the increase in the toll schedule their 
representative would have said as much at this point in the 
proceedings.  However, just as significantly, Coughlin did not 
object to Mr. Ervin's characterization of the dispute.  Moreover, 
the point of order appears directed not at the characterization 
but at the argument Ervin proceeded to make about the merits of 
the dispute. 
                         IV.  Conclusion 
              Because the Joint Committee exceeded its authority as 
arbitrator by deciding issues not submitted to it by the drivers 
and Ryder, we will reverse the order of the district court and 
remand the case with instructions to vacate the entire 
arbitration award pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4).  It is 
unnecessary to reach the merits of the arbitration award and we 
do not make a determination as to whether the award drew its 
essence from the collective bargaining agreement. 
